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 Abstract. 
 
One of the most important decisions regarding reverse logistics (RL) is whether to 
outsource such functions or not, due to the fact that RL does not represent a production or 
distribution firm’s core activity.  To explore the hypothesis that outsourcing RL functions is 
more suitable when returns are more variable, we formulate and analyze a Markov decision 
model of the outsourcing decision.  The reward function includes capacity and operating 
costs of either performing RL functions internally or outsourcing them, and the transitions 
among states reflect both the sequence of decisions taken and a simple characterization of the 
random pattern of returns over time.  We identify sufficient conditions on the cost parameters 
and the return fraction that guarantee the existence of an optimal threshold policy for 
outsourcing.  Under mild assumptions, this threshold is more likely to be crossed, the higher 
the uncertainty in returns.  A numerical example illustrates the existence of an optimal 
threshold policy even when the sufficient conditions are not satisfied and shows how the 
threshold for outsourcing decreases while the probability of crossing any fixed threshold 
increases with the return fraction.  
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1. Introduction. 
The flow of products does not stop upon their distribution to retailers and consumers: 
a substantial return flow of products may result from either generous return policies or 
extended producer responsibility legislation. We consider reverse logistics (RL) to include all 
activities associated with collecting, inspecting, reprocessing, redistributing, and disposing of 
items after they were originally sold (see Figure 1). Although it has long been perceived as a 
nuisance, recently it has been recognized as an area for improvement. Irrespective of their 
sizes, product types or geographic locations, most manufacturing, distribution and sales firms 
can benefit by improving the planning and control of RL activities. Unfortunately, not 
enough analytical models that assist in RL management decisions currently exist. 
There are many reasons why products are returned, either by consumers or by the 
companies involved in the distribution chain. Retailers may return products for such reasons 
as damage in transit, expired date code, the model being discontinued or replaced, 
seasonality, excessive retailer inventories, or going out of business. Consumers can return 
products because of quality problems or failure to meet the consumer’s needs; or for 
remanufacturing or proper disposal.  Some of the products returned before or soon after sale 
can be resold profitably.  In addition, after products have reached the end of their useful life, 
they may be able to be remanufactured, refurbished or repaired. These options can provide 
significant environmental and economic benefits in some instances, especially for products 
(e.g., electronic equipment) that have modular components that can be replaced, upgraded or 
refurbished. The value of remanufactured items typically will be lower than that of the same 
items produced for the first time, but substantially higher than that of items being sold for 
scrap, salvage or recycling (Stock, 1998). 
Given that RL is not the firm’s core activity, one of the most important decisions to be 
taken by any producer is whether or not to outsource such functions to a third-party reverse 
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logistics provider (3PRLP). This typically is an irreversible decision, because the chosen 
strategy, once adopted, will not be changed frequently.  The management of returns is 
complicated by the substantial uncertainties associated with their timing, volume and 
condition.  This paper focuses on how the uncertainty in the amount of units returned each 
period affects the decision of whether or not to outsource their RL management. 
Our central hypothesis is that outsourcing RL is more suitable when there is greater 
uncertainty about how many units may be returned.  This hypothesis arose from a qualitative 
analysis of the published literature on outsourcing of RL, which is overviewed briefly in the 
next section.  In Section 3, we formulate and analyze a Markov decision model of the 
outsourcing decision.  The reward function includes the most significant components of the 
cost of either performing RL functions internally or outsourcing them, and the transitions 
among states reflect both the sequence of decisions taken and a simple characterization of the 
random pattern of returns over time.  We assume that RL functions initially are performed 
internally.  In order to focus simply on the outsourcing decision, we limit our attention to two 
possible actions in each period:  either adjust internal capacity to match the expected number 
of returns in the next period, or switch permanently to outsourcing.  By analyzing the cost 
and transition probability functions, in Section 4 we identify sufficient conditions for the 
existence of an optimal monotone policy over the partially ordered state space, which reduces 
to a threshold of cumulative returns for any given capacity  level, beyond which outsourcing 
is optimal.  The conditions are relationships among the cost parameters and the product return 
fraction that could be verified easily.  Finally, we show that under mild assumptions, this 
threshold is more likely to be crossed when the uncertainty in returns is higher.  Section 5 
contains a numerical illustration of the existence of an optimal threshold policy even when 
the sufficient conditions are not met.  It also illustrates how the threshold for outsourcing 
decreases while the probability of crossing any fixed threshold increases with the variability 
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in the return volume.  Finally, in Section 6, we draw conclusions and outline future research 
that can be developed based on this work. 
 
2. Literature Review on Outsourcing RL Functions 
The perceived importance of RL has increased lately. A recent estimate of annual 
sales of remanufactured products exceeds $50 billion in the United States alone (Guide and 
van Wassenhove, 2003). There are no worldwide estimates of the economic scope of reuse 
activities, but the number of firms engaged in this sector is growing rapidly in response to the 
opportunities to create additional wealth and the enactment of extended producer 
responsibility legislation in several countries. In a survey of current literature, Dowlatshahi 
(2005) identified the present state of theory in RL. 
A number of researchers have addressed problems and opportunities in RL 
management.  Such management of RL systems is complicated by factors that are less 
prevalent in the forward supply chain, such as the uncertainty in product returns.  Recent 
work by Nakashima et al. (2004) illustrated how this uncertainty, which they characterized in 
terms of a virtual inventory level, can be modeled in a Markov decision process for 
controlling a remanufacturing system.   Multiple criteria may require consideration, such as 
in the selection of alternatives for product end-of-life disposition (Bufardi et al., 2004). 
As in the forward supply chain, some firms may opt to outsource logistical functions. 
In general, outsourcing can be defined as acquiring services from external service providers 
(Grover et al., 1994). This practice is increasingly pursued by organizations looking for cost 
benefits, operational efficiency, improved customer service and a better competitive position 
(Lieb and Randall, 1996; Boyson et al., 1999, Arroyo and Gaytán, 2007). Several streams of 
literature explain the bases of outsourcing decisions. Examples of these strands are 
Transactional Cost Theory (Williamson, 1979), Resource-based View (RBV) of the firm 
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(Wernerfelt, 1984), and evolutionary economics (Mahnke, 2001). Outsourcing research has 
focused extensively on the elaboration of the outsourcing process – identification of the 
outsourcing need, pros and cons of outsourcing, third party selection, establishment of the 
relation, and control and revision – however, few authors propose practical frameworks for 
guiding managers through the process of deciding when to outsource.  
Van Laarhoven et al. (2000) define the outsourcing of logistics activities as 
“…activities carried out by a logistics service provider on behalf of a shipper and consisting 
of at least management and execution of transportation and warehousing. In addition, other 
activities can be included, for example, inventory management, information related activities 
… or even supply chain management.”   Razzaque and Sheng (1998) surveyed the literature 
related to outsourcing logistics functions. Most models on outsourcing logistics (Bagchi and 
Virum, 1998; Vining and Globerman, 1999; Tayles and Drury, 2001; Sink and Langley, 
1997) consider the following steps: (1) definition of core competencies and strategy; (2) 
assessment of integral costs; and (3) analysis of suppliers and competitors. Several such 
studies have identified important considerations and emphasized the strategic nature of the 
decision.  In a survey of logistics managers in US manufacturing firms, Daugherty and Dröge 
(1997) found that organizational structure had a significant effect on whether and to what 
extent logistical functions such as warehousing and transportation were outsourced.  They 
noted that the basic economic justification of outsourcing logistics rests on economies of 
scale gained by specialization.  Boyson et al. (1999) surveyed logistics managers and found 
that the decision to outsource was driven by profit growth and increased focus on core 
competencies.  They concluded that, because significantly greater cost savings occurred when 
multiple logistical functions were outsourced, the outsourcing decision should be made 
strategically rather than to remedy specific deficiencies.  Insinga and Werle (2000) also 
emphasized the strategic nature of outsourcing decisions and suggested that firms should 
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outsource activities for which internal capability is weak and the potential for gaining 
competitive advantage is low.  An annual survey of large US manufacturers revealed that 
outsourcing of logistical functions had reached a record level in the most recent results 
reported (Lieb and Bentz, 2005).  Eighty percent of respondents outsourced at least one 
logistical function, most of whom outsourced several, and 37% reported contracting out 
reverse logistics (up from 26% in the previous year).  Initiation of logistics outsourcing 
contracts was based primarily on cost, and significant impacts on cost reduction were 
reported. Recently, a prescriptive outsourcing model based on the satisficing principle was 
proposed by De Boer et al. (2006) for guiding outsourcing decision processes.   
For the particular case of RL functions, outsourcing to a 3PRLP has been identified as 
one of the most important management strategies in recent years. Meade and Sarkis (2002) 
noted the three different choices available: to do nothing, to develop an internal RL function, 
or to find a 3PRLP and partner with them. They developed a model for selecting and 
evaluating 3PRLP once the choice to outsource had been made.  Krumwiede and Sheu (2002) 
considered a model for market entry by a 3PRLP, but Dowlatshahi (2000) warned that some 
potential 3PRLPs lack the required knowledge of RL networks.  One of the most important 
issues is to define whether the firm considers RL activities as part of its core functions. When 
this is not the case, outsourcing might represent a good alternative in order to allow the firm 
to focus on its core activities (Wu et al., 2005). 
In a detailed qualitative analysis, Serrato (2006) found that some of the most 
important 3PRLPs are found in industry sectors with high return variability and a short 
product life cycle. High variability in returns reduces the economic feasibility of maintaining 
a firm’s own RL facilities because the required capacity will be changing constantly. A faster 
response can be achieved by involving a 3PRLP, which specializes in these activities, and can 
take advantage of the economies of scale to convert RL functions into a profit-creating 
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activity. On the other hand, not many 3PRLPs are active in industry sectors with lower return 
variability and longer product life cycles, because it is easier for the producer to develop its 
own facilities to deal with the return flow, even though RL may not be part of its core 
activities. Serrato (2006) developed a detailed analysis of these conclusions regarding 
outsourcing RL functions. 
However, a qualitative analysis based on observation does not establish that observed 
practices are effective, nor does it explain how a specific characteristic such as return 
variability should influence the outsourcing decision.  In general, outsourcing decisions are 
based on a variety of qualitative as well as quantitative considerations (Daugherty and Dröge, 
1997).  This paper’s goal is to quantitatively examine the major characteristics that can be 
quantified so that the impact of return variability can be better understood as one input into a 
complex decision.  To our knowledge, it is the first quantitative examination of the reverse 
logistics outsourcing decision. The cost relationships under which a threshold policy is shown 
to be optimal describe conditions under which return variability is an important 
consideration.  The specific form of the threshold policy and the situations when the 
threshold is likely to be crossed identify the type of circumstance that should trigger a 
comprehensive study of possible outsourcing alternatives. 
 
3. Markov Decision Model. 
The model is designed to represent the major cost drivers in the outsourcing decision, the 
uncertainty in the return volume, temporal variability in sales, and the impracticality of 
multiple transitions between performing RL functions internally and outsourcing them. To 
focus on return volume variability, we assume that sales can be estimated accurately from 
relevant historical data and therefore are known.  Returns depend on the amount of units 
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previously sold and the fraction of them that will be returned through the firm’s RL system. 
Define the following notation: 
L = Length of the product life cycle, which depends on the particular RL scenario considered.  
W = Time length defined by the firm to continue managing the returns for the product 
analyzed, after the last sale was made. 
T = Length of the study horizon, T=L+W. 
t =  Decision epoch, t = 1, …, T – 1,  where decision epoch t represents the end of period t. 
Time T corresponds to the end of the problem horizon, where no decision is taken. 
st =  Amount of units sold by the firm during period t. 
St = Cumulative sales experienced by the firm from period 1 through the end of period t, 
1
t
t ii
S s== ∑ . 
r = Return fraction, i.e., the expected fraction of units previously sold but not yet returned 
that will be returned in the next period.  
xt = Number of units returned in period t. 
wt =Cumulative number of units returned from period 1 to the end of period t, 1
t
t ii
w x== ∑ . 
kt = RL capacity held by the firm at the beginning of period t, which represents the number of 
units that can be processed in a single period. 
nt= Number of units sold and not returned at the end of period t, ttt wSn −= . 
 
The following assumptions underlie the Markov decision model (MDM): 
Assumption 1:  The sales in each period of the study horizon are known, for instance, 
they can be estimated reliably from the sales history of similar products (Tibben-Lembke, 
2002). 
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Assumption 2:  Each item that has been sold and not returned has a fixed probability, 
r, of being returned in the next period, independent of all other items.  This is consistent with 
Toktay et al. (2003), where the number of periods between when a product was sold and 
when it was returned was modeled as a geometrically distributed random variable. It follows 
that given nt at time t, the number of returns in period t+1 has a binomial distribution with 
parameters nt and r, such that [ ] rnxE tt =+1 and [ ] ( )1Var 1t tx n r r+ = − . Note that the variance 
of return volume increases as nt increases, for fixed r. It also increases as r approaches 0.5 
from below. However, as Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (1999) observe, the return fraction in 
most industries is between zero and 0.3, approaching 0.5 only in some specific industry 
sectors. 
Assumption 3:  The firm’s RL capacity is continuous; i.e., it can be added or 
subtracted in any quantity. However, to simplify the model and focus on the strategic nature 
of the outsourcing decision, we assume that if reverse logistics functions are carried out 
internally, then the capacity will be adjusted to equal the expected number of returns in the 
next period. 
Assumption 4:  If the number of returns in a period exceeds the RL capacity, the firm 
pays a shortage penalty, which represents the cost of either disposal or outsourcing the return 
processing on a temporary, emergency basis.  No returns are carried over to a future period to 
be processed later.  This assumption is relevant when returns are economically perishable, so 
that the positive value to be gained from handling them promptly is lost or greatly diminished 
by delay; or when storage is not physically feasible. 
Several of these assumptions represent approximations of reality; for example, many 
firms hold inventories of returned products, capacity is frequently acquired in discrete 
chunks, and dependencies in whether or not products are returned may exist, especially if 
they are produced in the same facility and returned due to defect.  They streamline the model 
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to focus on the central binary decision of whether to outsource reverse logistics functions.  
Modifications to the model that relax or alter them are an important subject for further 
research, which we revisit in the Section 5.  Additional assumptions concerning costs are 
stated later in this section. 
 
3.1. Model Definition. 
3.1.1. States. 
The system state at each decision epoch t is defined as ( ), for 1,2, ...,t tk w t T= , where kt 
represents the RL capacity owned by the firm during period t, measured in units per period, 
and wt is the cumulative number of returns through the end of period t.  As described below, 
the system states are partially ordered according to wt. At decision epoch 0, the system state 
is ( )0 ,0k . 
3.1.2. Actions. 
Given that the purpose of the MDM is to determine whether and when to outsource, we 
assume that at the end of any period t, two actions are available: 
a = 0: Continue performing the RL activities internally by updating the firm’s 
capacity to the expected amount of returns in the next period, i.e., 
[ ] rnxEk ttt == ++ 11 . 
a=1:  Adopt an outsourcing strategy for the RL activities by having a 3PRLP perform 
such activities and taking the firm’s RL capacity to zero; i.e., kt+1 = 0.  Given 
that RL does not represent a core activity for the firm, it is also assumed that 
once the outsourcing decision is taken, it remains in place for the rest of the 
problem horizon.  This assumption is consistent with a survey result that, 
whereas 62% of respondents either outsourced handling of product returns or 
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expected to do so in the near future, only 4% reported having outsourced them 
previously but no longer (Boyson et al., 1999). 
Because tn  is an integer for all t, the problem has a discrete state space. 
3.1.3. Transition Probabilities. 
As the returns in each period follow a binomial distribution derived from the system state, 
and given that the sales function is also known, the transition probabilities among states are 
defined as ( ) ( ) { }1 1 1, , , for 0, 1t t t t tp k w k w a a+ + +⎡ ⎤ ∈⎣ ⎦ , where for a = 0 we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 for 0,1,...,, , ,0
0 otherwise
tn jt j
t
t t t t t
n
r r j n
p n r w j k w j
−
+
⎧⎛ ⎞ − =⎪⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ = ⎨⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎩
         (1) 
and for a = 1 we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 for 0,1,...,0, , ,1
0 otherwise.
tn jt j
t
t t t t
n
r r j n
p w j k w j
−
+
⎧⎛ ⎞ − =⎪⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ = ⎨⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎩
       (2) 
That is, the action taken determines the next period’s capacity, but the second state variable 
1tw +  depends only on ttt wSn −=  according to the binomial distribution for the returns. 
3.1.4. Rewards. 
Define the following set of costs, where a capacity unit represents firm’s ability to process 
one returned item during a single period:  
c1: Unit investment cost for increasing the firm’s capacity ($/capacity unit). 
c2:  Unit capacity disinvestment cost ($/capacity unit). 
c3:  Fixed internal capacity maintenance cost ($/capacity unit/period). 
c4:  Unit internal labor cost ($/unit). 
c5:  Unit shortage cost ($/unit). 
c6:  Unit capacity salvage value ($/capacity unit). 
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c7:  Unit outsourcing cost ($/unit). 
We assume c1, c3, c4, c5, c7 > 0 because they represent costs for the firm, while c2 and c6 are 
unrestricted in sign, which models the net cost of contracting capacity and salvaging 
equipment as positive or negative. Figure 1 shows where these costs are located in the RL 
chain.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between RL chain and costs considered in the MDM. 
 
Given that RL does not represent a core activity for the firm, profits from remanufacturing 
are not considered. We assume the following relationships between the cost parameters: 
1 2
3 2
4 7
7 5
5 1 3 4
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
c c
c c
c c
c c
c c c c
≥
≥
<
<
≥ + +
 
First, (3) implies that what is gained when capacity is contracted is less than what was 
invested to expand it; i.e., there can be no profit from simply expanding and later contracting 
capacity. Inequality (4) states that the cost of decreasing the firm’s capacity is no greater than 
the cost of maintaining it for an additional period. Also, (5) is reasonable because 7c  must 
cover both fixed and variable costs for the 3PRLP, whereas 4c  consists only of the variable 
cost for the firm. Because of the economies of scale expected to exist because RL is a core 
activity for the 3PRLP, fixed costs per unit for the 3PRLP are lower than fixed costs per unit 
for the firm.  Note that 7c  represents the unit price charged by the 3PRLP, which it offers 
based on its own internal cost structure.  In practice, contracts may include fixed fees and/or 
volume discounts, but we do not consider them in this paper.  Also, (6) is appropriate because 
otherwise, all the 3PRLP’s potential clients could keep their own capacity low and just pay 
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the shortage cost rather than following an outsourcing option.  On the other hand, inequality 
(7) represents a motivation to develop internal capacity, as the total internal cost of 
maintaining the capacity for one additional period and then processing one additional unit is 
less than the shortage cost for that unit. 
With these cost parameters, the following reward structure is defined for actions a=0 
or 1.  Let ( )1 , ,t t tR k w a+ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  be the expected reward at time 1+t  when the system is in state 
( )tt wk ,  and action a is taken. For a = 0, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 3
4 1 5 1
, ,0
min , ,
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
R k w c n r k c k n r c n r
c E x n r c E x n r
+ +
+
+
+ +
= − − − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
    (8) 
where ( )+⋅  denotes ( )max ,0⋅ . It is assumed that any unit that was not managed through the 
RL system in the period it was returned is lost and will not be remanufactured later.  For a = 
1, 
   ( ) ( )( )1 6 7
1 1
, ,1 1 1 , where 0 1
L L
T l
t t t t t l
l t l t
R k w c k c n s r if t L−+
= + = +
⎛ ⎞= − − − − = + >⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ . (9) 
Here, 7c  represents the payment made to the 3PRLP for all expected returns from 
period t+1 until the end of the horizon. Recall that, given that RL is not a core activity for the 
firm, it is assumed that the outsourcing option will remain in effect for the remainder of the 
planning horizon, once that option is taken. Recall also from assumption 1 that the future 
sales can also be estimated accurately.  This function also implies that the 3PRLP has infinite 
capacity, given the fact that RL does represent a core activity for it. 
The terminal reward in period T is: 
( ) { }1 6 5, , , for 0,1 and 0T T T T T TR k w a c k c n a k+ = − ∈ >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , (10) 
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because the RL capacity defined by the firm is taken to zero in the last period, incurring the 
corresponding salvage value. Also, this function reflects the cost incurred by not being able to 
remanufacture any expected returned unit during period T or later. 
3.2. System dynamics. 
At the end of each period t the system: 
1. Has capacity in the amount of kt.  A cumulative number, wt, of units have been 
returned, and there are nt units that are still in the market (were already sold and have 
not been returned); 
2. Computes the expected number of returns in the next period and applies a control 
δt+1(kt,wt)= 0 or 1.  If δt+1(kt,wt) = 0, kt+1 is set equal to tn r  and the firm incurs either 
an investment cost ( )+− tt krnc1 , or a disinvestment cost ( )+− rnkc tt2  from adjusting 
the capacity, as well as a fixed cost rnc t3 ;  If δt+1(kt,wt) = 1, kt+1 is set equal to zero 
and the firm incurs a salvage value tkc6 ; 
3. Experiences a random amount of returns xt+1, which determines the new system state 
( )111, +++ += tttt xwwk , and an amount of sales st+1, which determines the new 
cumulative sales level for the firm (St+1 = St + st+1); 
4. Incurs either an internal or a shortage cost, ( )rnxc tt ,min 14 +  or ( )++ − rnxc tt 15 , 
respectively, if δt+1(kt,wt) = 1 and outsourcing cost ( )( )7
1
1 1
L
T l
t l
l t
c n s r −
= +
⎛ ⎞− − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ , 
otherwise. 
Given an initial system state (k0,0), the problem is to find a sequence of decision 
functions {δ1*(k0,0), δ2*(k1,w1), …, δT*(kT-1,wT-1)} that maximizes the total expected reward. 
The optimal policy can be obtained by solving recursively: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
[ ]
1 1 1
0
1
, ,0 , , ,0 , ,
, max
( , ),1
tn
t t t t t t t t t t t
jt t t
t t t
R k w p n r w j k w u n r w j
u k w
R k w
+ + +
=
+
⎧ ⎫+ + +⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦= ⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
∑  (11) 
where ( )ttt wku ,  represents the maximum expected reward earned by continuing optimally 
from state ( )tt wk ,  onwards.  
4.  A Threshold Policy 
In principle, equation (11) can be solved recursively backwards from period T to identify an 
optimal action for each possible state.  However, depending on the length of the study 
horizon, the sales volumes, and the granularity of the state space (i.e., the definition of a 
“unit” sold or processed), the number of states to be evaluated could grow very large. As 
Puterman (1994) observes, in order to reduce the amount of computation and increase appeal 
to decision-makers and managerial insight, it is desirable to identify a simple form for an 
optimal policy.  Based on a partial ordering of the state space, below we establish the 
existence of an optimal monotone policy that corresponds to a threshold (in terms of the 
cumulative returns given a particular capacity level), beyond which the outsourcing action 
a=1 is optimal.  Such a form also facilitates exploration of conditions under which 
outsourcing is more likely to be optimal.  Below this threshold, the firm should continue 
performing the RL activities internally (a=0).  Next, conditions for the existence of an 
optimal deterministic nondecreasing policy are defined. 
 
4.1 General conditions for the existence of a optimal monotone policy. 
Sets of conditions exist that ensure that optimal policies are monotone in the system state 
(Puterman, 1994). For such a concept to be meaningful, it is required that the state have a 
physical interpretation and some natural ordering. The expression “monotone policy” refers 
to a monotone deterministic Markovian policy. 
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For the MDM proposed, the states are partially ordered in terms of the cumulative 
returned units wt.  Specifically, for each t, let the states (kt, wt) be strictly partially ordered as 
( ) ( ) 21212211 ,, wwandkkwkwk <=⇔≺ , which is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the strict partial state ordering. 
 
In addition to the partial ordering defined, a cumulative probability is needed to identify the 
conditions for a monotone nondecreasing policy: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1, , , , , ,t
t l
n
t t l t t t t t t t
w w
q k w k w a p k w k w a+ + + + +
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ , 
where from (1): 
( )( )[ ] ( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<
≥−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
−
−
−=+
∑
1
1
1
1
0,,,
tl
tl
jnj
n
wwj
t
ttltt
wwfor
wwforrr
j
n
wkwrnq
t
t
tl
 
and from (2): 
( )( )[ ] ( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<
≥−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= ∑−= −+
tl
n
wwj
tl
jnjt
ttlt
wwfor
wwforrr
j
n
wkwq
t
tl
t
1
1
1,,,01  
Finally, recall the definition of a superadditive function.  Let X and Y be partially 
ordered sets and g(x,y) a real-valued function on X ×Y. It is said that g is superadditive if for 
x x− +≤  in X and y y− +≤  in Y, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+−−+−−++ +≥+ yxgyxgyxgyxg ,,,, . 
One set of conditions stated by Puterman (1994) for the existence of a monotone 
optimal policy are: 
1. Rt+1[(kt,wt),a] is nondecreasing in (kt,wt) for { }0,1a∈ , 
2. qt+1[(kt+1,wt+1=wl)⏐(kt,wt),a] is nondecreasing in (kt,wt) for all wl and { }0,1a∈ , 
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3. Rt+1[(kt,wt),a] is a superadditive function on (kt,wt) × a, 
4. qt+1[kt+1,wt+1=wl)⏐(kt,wt),a] is a superadditive function on (kt,wt) × a, and 
5. RT+1[(kT,wT),a] is nondecreasing in (kT,wT). 
When all of these conditions are satisfied, there exists a monotone nondecreasing policy that 
is optimal.   
 
4.2. Specific conditions for an optimal threshold policy 
In order to prove that these five conditions are satisfied, the following lemma will be used: 
Lemma 1. 
Suppose Xn is binomial with parameters n and r, where n = 2, 3, …, and 0 < r < 1. 
Let [ ] nrXE nn ==μ .  Then for any n and l = 1, 2, …, n-1, 
( ) ( )( ) n n l la E X E Xμ μ+ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ≥ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
( )[ ] ( )[ ]llnn XEXEb μμ ,min,min)( ≥  
(c)  For any integer m such that lm ≤≤0 , [ ] [ ]mXPmXP ln >≥> . 
Proof:  In the Appendix. 
Theorem 1 applies Puterman’s conditions to the context of this paper.  The managerial 
implication is that for any fixed capacity level, there exists a threshold number of cumulative 
returns such that outsourcing is optimal for any greater or equal number of cumulative 
returns.   
Theorem 1 
If ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 7 5 1 3 4 7 4 1 3c c c c c c r c c c c− − − − ≤ ≤ − + , then there exist optimal decision rules 
δt+1*(kt,wt) for t = 0, …, T-1 that are nondecreasing in (kt,wt) according to the partial order 
defined. 
The proof is presented in the following five subsections: 
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4.2.1. Condition 1. 
This condition holds when the cost of either action does not increase with the number of 
items sold but not yet returned. For a=1, it requires that ( ) ( )1 1, ,1 , ,1t t t t t tR k w R k w i+ +≤ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
for tni ≤≤1 , which follows immediately from i > 0 and c7 >0. 
For a=0, the condition [ ] [ ]1 1( , ),0 ( , ),0t t t t t tR k w R k w i+ +≤ +  for tni ≤≤1 , i.e., that the 
expected internal RL reward increases with the cumulative amount of returned units wt, is 
equivalent to: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( ) ttttt tttttttt nirinYErnXEcrinYErnXEc
ricrinkrnkckrinkrnc
≤≤≤−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−
++
++++
1,0,min,min
)()(
54
321
 
where c1, c3, c4, c5>0 and X (Y) is binomially distributed with parameters nt (nt – i), 
respectively, and r. From parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 1, the elements that multiply c4 and c5 
are nonnegative. 
This inequality can be analyzed in three cases.  If t tn r k< , it is equivalent to: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( ) ttt tt nirinYErnXEc
rinYErnXEcccir
≤≤≤−−−−−
−−−−−
++ 1,0
,min,min
5
423  
which is satisfied, given inequality (4) and Lemma 1.  If ( )t tk n i r≤ − , it can be reduced to: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( ) ttt tt nirinYErnXEc
rinYErnXEcccir
≤≤≤−−−−−
−−−+−
++ 1,0
,min,min
5
431  
which follows from the assumption of positive cost coefficients.  Finally, if 
( )t t tn i r k n r− ≤ ≤ , it is: 
 
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( ) ttt tttt nirinYErnXEc
rinYErnXEcccrnk
≤≤≤−−−−−
−−−+−
++ 1,0
,min,min
5
421  
which holds under inequalities (3) and (4). 
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4.2.2. Condition 2. 
This condition holds when it is more likely to meet or exceed a given number of cumulative 
returns in the next period, if a higher number of returns have been experienced up to the 
current period. It requires that for a fixed t lw w= : 
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ,1,,,,,, 1111 tttlttttltt niaiwkwkqawkwkq ≤≤+≤ ++++  
which can be analyzed under the three cases: l tw w≤ , t l tw w w i< < +  and t lw i w+ < . 
In the first case, the cumulative returns in period t are greater than or equal to wl. 
Then, the probability that such cumulative returns will equal or exceed wl in the next period is 
1; i.e., the condition is satisfied as an equality. In the second case, the cumulative returns are 
already greater than wl in the right hand side of the inequality (wl≤wt+i). This implies that the 
probability on the right hand side equals 1, so that the inequality holds regardless of the 
probability on the left hand side.  Finally, for the third case, this condition can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ,,11 l
n
wwj
tt
jinj
in
iwwj
tjnjt wiwwrr
j
in
rr
j
nt
tl
t
t
tl
t <+<−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −≤−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∑ ∑
−=
−−−
−−=
− , 
which is equivalent to: 
[ ] [ ]1 1l t l tP X w w P Y w w i≤ − − ≥ ≤ − − − . 
This follows directly from Lemma 1(c). 
4.2.3. Condition 3. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1, ,1 , ,0 , ,1 , ,0t t t t t t t t t t t tR k w R k w R k w i R k w i+ + + +− ≤ + − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
This inequality holds when for a fixed capacity kt, the incremental effect on the reward of 
switching to an outsourcing strategy increases with the cumulative number of returned units 
wt. This condition can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 7 3
4 5
( ) ( )
min , min , ( ) ( ) for 1
t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
c n i r k n r k c k n i r k n r ic irc
c E X n r E Y n i r c E X n r E Y n i r i n
+ + + +
+ +
− − − − + − − − − + − ≥
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − − − − ≤ ≤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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where, as in Condition 1, X (Y) is binomially distributed with parameters nt (nt – i), 
respectively, and r, and from Lemma 1 (a) and (b), the expressions that multiply c4 and c5  are 
nonnegative. 
Consider the same three cases as for Condition 1.  If t tn r k< , the inequality is: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )++ −−−− +−−≥−− rinYErnXEc rinYErnXEcirccic tt tt54237
,min,min
          (12) 
Considering that ∑
+−=
+= t
t
n
inj
jUYX
1
, where each Uj independently equals 1 with probability r 
and 0 otherwise, this inequality can be analyzed under the four possible cases shown in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1. Worst case analysis for Condition 3. 
 
If ( )t tk n i r≤ − , the inequality is: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )++ −−−− +−−≥+− rinYErnXEc rinYErnXEcirccic tt tt54317
,min,min
 
Following the same analysis, the resulting inequalities in the worst cases are shown in the last 
column of Table 1. 
 
Finally, if ( )t t tn i r k n r− ≤ ≤ , the inequality is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )
( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]( )++ −−−− +−−≥−−+−+− rinYErnXEc rinYErnXEcrinkckrncircic tt tttttt 5 42137
,min,min
 
By comparison with inequality (12), this inequality will be satisfied as long as: 
( )( ) 021 ≥−− tt krncc  
which is true given (3). 
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Then, the following relationships are sufficient to satisfy Condition 3: 
( ) ( )5 7 5 4 3 2c c c c r c c r− ≤ − − −              (13) 
( )rcccc 2347 −≥−      (14) 
( ) ( )5 7 5 4 1 3c c c c r c c r− ≤ − − +     (15) 
( )rcccc 3147 +≥−      (16) 
However given (3), inequalities (13) and (14) are redundant. Inequality (15) is equivalent to a 
lower bound on r:  
5 7
5 1 3 4
c cr
c c c c
−≥ − − −      (17) 
while inequality (16) can be stated as an upper bound: 
 7 4
1 3
c cr
c c
−≤ +  (18) 
These bounds represent sufficient conditions on the return fraction in terms of the cost 
parameters to guarantee superadditivity of the reward function.  Because they were obtained 
by a worst case analysis that ignores the probability distributions of X and Y, it is possible that 
less restrictive conditions could be found. 
4.2.4. Condition 4. 
This condition implies that the difference between the cumulative probability that returns 
exceed a given number when taking the outsourcing option and when performing RL 
activities internally, does not decrease with the cumulative number of returns. This condition 
can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
, , ,1 , , ,0
, , ,1 , , ,0
t t l t t t t l t t
t t l t t t t l t t
q k w k w q k w k w
q k w k w q k w k w
+ +
+ + + +
− −
+ + + +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International Journal of Production Research 2007, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207540701450161. Posted with permission.
   21
where −+ > tt ww . It is satisfied as an equality because the action determines the next capacity 
level while random events affect only the cumulative returns. 
4.2.5. Condition 5. 
This condition implies that the terminal reward increases with the number of cumulative 
returns.  The inequality ( ) ( )1 1, , , ,T T T T T TR k w a R k w i a+ +≤ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  for 1 Ti n≤ ≤  can be written 
as ( )6 5 6 5T T T Tc k c n r c k c n i r− ≤ − − , which follows from 05 >c . 
4.2.6 Implications. 
Inequality (17) states a lower bound on the return fraction as a ratio of two quantities:  
the opportunity (regret) cost 5 7c c−  of not taking the outsourcing option and incurring the 
corresponding shortage for a particular unit, and the difference between the shortage cost and 
the total cost of internal processing.  The magnitude of the lower bound depends on the 
relationship between internal and outsourced costs of processing returns.  Inequality (18) is 
an upper bound on the return fraction expressed as another ratio, where the numerator is the 
difference between the outsourcing cost and the internal variable cost and the denominator is 
the total internal investment and capacity cost.  The magnitude of the ratio depends on the 
economies of scale achieved by the 3PRLP.  Counter-intuitively, the bounds are wider when 
the unit outsourcing cost is large relative to the internal costs.  It should be emphasized, 
however, that these inequalities represent sufficient rather than necessary conditions for the 
existence of an optimal nondecreasing policy.  The numerical illustration in Section 5 shows 
that such a policy can exist even under severe violations of these conditions.  
4.3. Impact of return uncertainty on crossing the threshold 
The result of Theorem 1 implies that, in any period t: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2 * 1 1 * 2 2, ,t t t t t t t t t tk k and w w a k w a k w= < ⇒ ≤ . 
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In the remainder of this section, the subscript t  is suppressed for simplicity.  Define the 
outsourcing threshold for each capacity level as: 
[ ] ( ){ } [ ]*min : , 1 if exists
otherwise.
w a k w k
k
θθ ⎧ =⎪= ⎨∞⎪⎩
 
 
Lemma 2: 
Let [ ];k rθ  be the value of [ ]kθ  when the return fraction is r . If 5.00 ≤Δ+≤≤ rrr  and 
5 44.375c c≤ ,              (19) 
then 
[ ] [ ]; ; rk r k rθ θ≥ + Δ  .            (20) 
Proof:  In the Appendix. 
Note that the maximum value for the ratio 5 4c c  in (19) is a lower bound on the requirement 
that holds for states with any number of outstanding items, 2n ≥ .  In a practical situation, 
when n would be much larger, the inequality imposes no significant constraint on 5 4c c . 
 
Lemma 3: 
Let ( ) ( ), , ,0;lq nr w k w r⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  be the value of ( ) ( ), , ,0lq nr w k w⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  when the return fraction is r .  
If 0 0.5rr≤ + Δ ≤  then: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,0; , , ,0;r l r lq n r w k w r q nr w k w r⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Δ + Δ ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦                       (21) 
Proof:  In the Appendix. 
 
Theorem 2: 
Suppose an optimal nondecreasing policy exists and the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. 
Then 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International Journal of Production Research 2007, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207540701450161. Posted with permission.
   23
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ), ; , ,0; , ; , ,0;r r rq n r k r k w r q nr k r k w rθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Δ + Δ + Δ ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Proof: 
From Lemma 2 we have [ ] [ ]; ; rk r k rθ θ≥ + Δ , which implies that: 
[ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ), , , ,0; , ; , ,rq nr k r k w r q nr k r k w rθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Δ ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .            (22) 
By Lemma 3, 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ), , , ,0; , ; , ,r r r rq n r k r k w r q nr k r k w rθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Δ + Δ + Δ ≥ + Δ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ .   (23) 
Then, we have by transitivity that: 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ), , , ,0; , ; , ,r r rq n r k r k w r q nr k r k w rθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ Δ + Δ + Δ ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , 
which completes the proof. 
 
Theorem 2 shows that the suitability of the outsourcing option increases when the 
return fraction increases because the threshold value does not increase and the probability of 
crossing any given level of cumulative returns does not decrease. Because the variance of the 
number of returns increases with 0.5r ≤ , this result supports the hypothesis that greater 
variability in the return volume motivates outsourcing.   
 
5.  Numerical Illustration 
To demonstrate the influence of higher uncertainty in the return volume on the suitability of 
an outsourcing option, consider a particular scenario defined by the parameters: 
131
21
24
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cc
cc
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cL
    (24) 
and the sales function: 
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( )
2 , 1,2,..., 2
2 2 1 , 2 1,...,
t
M t t L
Ls
MM t L t L L
L
⎧ =⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ − − − = +⎪⎩
   (25) 
where M represents the maximum sales level experienced by the firm during the life cycle, 
and 3=M  in this numerical example. The values for the cost parameters satisfy conditions 
(3) to (7) but not the sufficient conditions (17) and (18) for the existence of an optimal 
nondecreasing policy.  The lower bound on r from (17) is 11/12 and the upper bound from 
(18) is 5/4.  However, solving by backward induction identifies such an optimal policy for 
values of the return fraction as small as 0.2. 
Table 2 shows the values for the threshold in each set of states, for 
{ }5.0,4.0,3.0,2.0=r , as well as the probability ( ) ( )1 1, , ,t t l t tq k w k w a+ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  that the threshold 
(labeled as lw ) is crossed in each case.  These values were obtained by creating a Matlab 
program, whose inputs are ,,,,, 21 ccWLr 76543 ,,,, ccccc , as well as the sales volume ts during 
the analysis horizon.  Based on this information, the program computes the possible states 
and orders them according to the criteria defined. The program also computes the amount of 
units tn  outstanding in the market for each state, as well as the corresponding transition 
probabilities and expected costs for 0=a and 1=a . The terminal costs are also obtained. 
Based on this, the program solves the MDM by using backward induction, and shows the 
optimal action to take at each decision epoch. 
 
Table 2. Value of the threshold and the probability of crossing it for { }0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5r =   
 
As can be seen in Table 2, a greater uncertainty in the return volume (greater r ) 
increases the probability of crossing the corresponding threshold in each set of states; i.e., 
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there is a greater probability that outsourcing ( 1=a ) will be the optimal action to take.  For 
example for t = 4, if r = 0.2 then for k4 = 8r = 1.6 there is no outsourcing threshold, but if r = 
0.4 then for k4 = 4r = 1.6 a finite threshold of 8 units does exist.  Also, if r = 0.3 then for k4 = 
8r = 2.4 the threshold value is 8 and the crossing probability is 0.001.  If r = 0.4 then for the 
same capacity k4 = 6r = 2.4, the threshold value drops to 7 while the crossing probability rises 
to 0.04. This example confirms that greater variability in the return volume increases the 
uncertainty about the volume of units put into the corresponding RL system, which motivates 
the firm to follow an outsourcing strategy and take advantage of the economies of scale by 
involving a 3PRLP in managing the returned items. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
A Markov Decision Model (MDM) for evaluating the decision to outsource RL is developed 
in this research. It considers several elements that are critical in defining the characteristics of 
a RL network, such as the uncertainty in the return volume, the length of the product life 
cycle, the sales behavior, the particular RL costs incurred, and the length of time defined for 
the existence of that RL system. In particular, the uncertainty implied in the MDM is 
represented by the number of returned units, which depends on the number of units 
outstanding in the market and the return fraction. 
Some sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal monotone nondecreasing 
policy are derived as bounds on the return fraction defined by the cost parameters.  The 
existence of an optimal monotone nondecreasing policy implies the presence of a threshold 
above which it is optimal to follow an outsourcing strategy for the RL system; otherwise, to 
continue performing the RL activities internally. This threshold is defined in terms of a 
partial ordering for the system states, where given a fixed capacity at a decision epoch, the 
states are ordered according to the cumulative returned units, such that if that volume goes 
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above a particular level, then it is optimal to follow an outsourcing strategy and take 
advantage of the economies of scale implied by involving a 3PRLP, which has RL as its core 
function.  The value of the threshold and probability it is crossed characterize the prevalence 
of outsourcing. 
While the existence of an optimal monotone policy appeals to intuition and simplifies 
computation, its chief value in this paper is to assess conditions under which outsourcing is 
more likely to be optimal.  The main result is that as the return fraction increases the 
outsourcing threshold is more likely to be crossed.  Because the variance of the binomially 
distributed number of returns increases with reasonable values of the return fraction, this 
result supports the hypothesis that variability in return volumes motivates outsourcing RL. 
A numerical illustration shows that an optimal threshold policy exists even when our 
sufficient conditions are not met.  It confirms that, when the return fraction is higher, 
outsourcing thresholds are smaller and the probability of crossing them is higher. 
Because the model presented here is the first to our knowledge to quantitatively 
examine the decision of whether or not to outsource RL, ample opportunity exists for further 
research that could relax the assumptions of the model, identify less restrictive conditions for 
existence of a monotone policy, or study the effect of other drivers for outsourcing. 
By reconsidering the model assumptions, additional research could model more 
complex capacity and inventory management policies than the one considered here, either 
because the firm cannot adjust its capacity each period, or a different adjustment policy is 
found to result in better performance.  In practice, firms do keep inventories of returned 
products even though their value frequently is declining rapidly.  The irreversibility of the 
outsourcing decision assumed in this paper also could be relaxed, in view of the fact that the 
3PRLP selected may fail to perform adequately. On the economic side, the potential for 
profits from reprocessing and selling returned items may be considered as a benefit of 
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maintaining RL capacity internally.  The model for contracting arrangements with the 3PRLP 
could consider a tiered pricing structure, capacity reservations, or other means by which the 
3PRLP could cover its capacity investment costs and reduce risk. 
Several problem parameters, such as the return fraction and/or the RL costs may not 
be constant during the product’s life cycle.  Nonstationary costs will be easy to incorporate, 
but variation in the return fraction will require more elaborate modifications to the analysis.  
More generally, another area of research would identify the requirements for the existence of 
an optimal monotone nondecreasing policy, when the returns follow a probability distribution 
different than the one described in this paper.  A different stochastic model for returns could 
allow investigation of the effects of separate changes in the mean and variance of returns per 
period. 
Regarding the analysis, the sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone 
policy found are not necessary, and it may be possible to find less restrictive ones by an 
average- rather than worst-case analysis. 
Finally, this paper focuses on how the return fraction influences the outsourcing 
decision.  Many other important characteristics of the sales and return functions could be 
examined.  The life cycle length has been identified in empirical studies as another 
differentiator between industry sectors where outsourcing RL is common and those where it 
is not (Serrato, 2006).  Analysis of the influence of the life cycle length on outsourcing 
suitability represents a future research area to consider. The main challenge for this analysis 
in the MDM state space is the difference in the cardinality of the sets of ordered states 
obtained for each case.  The size of the state space at each decision epoch is determined by 
the sales function of the product analyzed, as well as the length of the lifecycle.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
(a) Suppose 1−= nl  and consider 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1
1
n n n n n
n n
E X nr X nr r E E X nr X nr r X
where X X U
+ ++ +
− − −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − = − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
= +
 
where U = 1 with probability r and 0 otherwise.  There are three possible cases for 1nX m− = . 
If m nr r< − , then ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1n n nE X nr X nr r X m r m nr+ + +− −⎡ ⎤− − − − = = + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  given that 
nr>m. Then, this case yields a nonnegative result. If nr r m nr− ≤ < , then 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1n n nE X nr X nr r X m nr m r++ − −⎡ ⎤− − − − = = − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
where, given that nr>m, the expression is also nonnegative. Finally, if nr m≤ , then 
( ) ( )( ) 0n lE X nr E X nr r ++ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − − − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Then, to complete the conditioning argument: 
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Then, considering that ( ) ( )1 1 0n n n nE X E Xμ μ+ +− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  and, since n is arbitrary, we 
have, by the transitive property: 
 ( ) ( ) 0 1, 2,... 1n n l lE X E X for any l nμ μ+ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − ≥ = −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
which completes the proof. 
(b) Suppose 1−= nl  and consider 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )[ ][ ]
UXXwhere
XrnrXnrXEErnrXnrXE
nn
nnnnn
+=
−−=−−
−
−−−
1
111 ,min,min,min,min  
where U = 1 with probability r and 0 otherwise.  Suppose rnrmX n −<=−1 . Then 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1min , min , min 1, 1n n nE X nr X nr r X m r m nr r m m− −⎡ ⎤− − = = + + − −⎣ ⎦   
since nrmrnrm <⇒−< . Also, ( ) rmnrmrmnr +≥+⇒+> ,1min , so 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 211,1min rmmrrmrmmrnrmr =−−++≥−−++ . 
On the other hand, suppose rnrmX n −≥=−1 . Then 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1min , min , 1 min ,n n nE X nr X nr r X m rnr r m nr nr r− −⎡ ⎤− − = = + − − +⎣ ⎦   
because nrmrnrm ≥+⇒−≥ 1 .  Also, ( ) rnrnrm −≥,min , which implies that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22 1,min1 rrnrrnrrnrrnrnrmrrnr =+−−−+≥+−−+ . 
To complete the conditioning argument: 
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( ) ( )
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Then: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0,min,min 11 ≥− −− nnnn XEXE μμ . 
and since n is arbitrary, we have, by the transitive property: 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ] 1,...,2,10,min,min −=≥− nlanyforXEXE llnn μμ  
which completes the proof. 
(c) Suppose 1−= nl  and consider 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) [ ]
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which implies that the probability of experiencing more than m successes is greater when one 
additional trial is added to the sequence of Bernoulli trials.  Then, since n is arbitrary, we 
have, by transitivity: 
[ ] [ ] 1,...,2,10 −=>>−> nlanyforkXPkXP ln  
which completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
Let [ ];w k rθ≡ , and let ( ), , ;R k w a r⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  be the value of ( ), ,R k w a⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ when the return fraction 
is r . In order to prove (20), the following inequalities must be satisfied, given the 
relationships for r  and rΔ  defined in terms of the cost parameters: 
( ) ( ), ,0; , ,1;R k w r R k w r≤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦                          (26) 
( ) ( ), ,0; , ,1;r rR k w r R k w r+ Δ ≤ + Δ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦          (27) 
where (26) comes from the definition of w .  Inequality (27) implies that the threshold is not 
greater than w  when the return fraction increases by rΔ ; i.e., the threshold does not increase 
when the return fraction increases, as stated in (20). 
Given that by definition of w , inequality (26) is satisfied, and that the right-hand sides 
in both inequalities are equal (they do not depend on r ), inequality (27) will be satisfied as 
long as: 
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( ) ( ), ,0; , ,0;rR k w r R k w r+ Δ ≤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ,                         (28) 
where (28) can be rewritten as: 
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Given (3) and (4), the following part of (29) is nonnegative: 
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Consider the remaining elements of (29): 
( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
( )( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )++ −−Δ+− +−Δ+ nrxErnxEc nrxErnxEc rr 215 214
,min,min
     (30) 
Let ( ) ( )min ,ng r E X nr= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and ( ) ( )max ,0nf r E X nr= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  where ( )binomial ,X n r∼  
and 2n ≥ .  Then, (30) will be true if the combined cost function ( ) ( )4 5n nc g r c f r+  is an 
increasing function of r. 
The derivatives of fn and gn are discontinuous at r = j/n, j = 1, …, n-1, which implies 
that a separate expression is needed for the derivatives in each interval for r. For 
1, or equivalently 1,j jr j nr j
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where ( ) ( )1 n kknp k r r
k
−⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  Then  
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We wish to show that ( ) ( )( ) 054 ≥+ rfcrgcdr
d
nn  for reasonable values of 4 5c c< . 
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The proof is inductive, using integration by parts.  First, for j = 0, or equivalently, 0 1nr< ≤ , 
integrating by parts with ( )1 1u n r= − +  and ( ) 11 ndv n r dr−= − we get:  
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And for j = 1, or equivalently, 1 2nr< ≤ , 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ]( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 12 2
1
1
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 ,
n n n
n n
n n
n n r r n r dr n r n r r n r n r dr
nr nr r r nr r
nr r nr nr r
− − −
−
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − + = − − + − + − − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
= − − + − − + −
= − + − −
∫ ∫
where the second equality results from substituting for the j = 0 integral. 
Now, for j > 1, assume: 
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Then: 
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and can be verified for j = 1 and j = 2.  Then for j > 2, assume the equality is true for j – 1 as 
above.  For j, 
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This completes the proof of (a). 
(c) Using (a), for 1, or equivalently 1,j jr j nr j
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+< ≤ < ≤ +  
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Now, ( ), ,j n rφ  < 0 if 1
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+> + .  Consider 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 21 1 21 1 1 1 1 2 1 1n j n jj j jd r j r n r r r n n r n j r j j
dr
− − − −+ −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − + = − + − + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
This quantity is negative between the two roots 
( )( )
( )
11
1 1
n j n jjr
n n n
+ −+= ±+ + .  Clearly, the 
lower root is less than 1
1
j
n
+
+ , and it can be verified that the upper root is greater than or equal 
to 1j
n
+  (which is the upper endpoint of the interval for r where this expression for the 
combined cost function is valid) since 2n ≥ .  Therefore, ( ), ,j n rφ  takes its most negative 
value at 1jr
n
+= , where it equals: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 11 1 1
1 1
j n j
n j j
n
n j j jn j j n
j n n n
n n j j
n j
j n
− −
− − +
⎛ ⎞ + + +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤− − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
− − +⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
(d) Finally, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
4 5 4 5 4
1 11
5 4
1 1
1 11
4 4
1 1
0 if 
1 1
 or 
1 1
1 1 1 1 ,
n j j
n n n
n j jn
n j j
n j jn
n n j jd c g r c f r c n c c n j
jdr n
n
n n j n j j
j
c c
n
n j n j j
j
n
c n n j n j j c h j n
j
− − +
− − ++
− − +
− − ++
− − +⎛ ⎞+ ≥ ≥ − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ − − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠≤ ⎛ ⎞ − − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= + − − − + = +⎡ ⎤⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 
Because ( ),h j n  is an increasing function of n, then for a fixed value of j, 
( )5 4 1 ,2 1c c h j j⎡ ⎤≤ + +⎣ ⎦  suffices for all n > 2j.  In turn, ( ), 2 1 (1,3) 3.375h j j h+ ≥ = .  
Therefore, the expression in (30) is nonnegative as long as 5 44.375c c≤ . 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in International Journal of Production Research 2007, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/00207540701450161. Posted with permission.
   38
 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Inequality (21) can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ ∑
= =
−− −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≥Δ−−Δ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛n
wj
n
wj
jnjjn
r
j
r
l l
rr
j
n
rr
j
n
11  
which is equivalent to: 
[ ] [ ] { }nwforwxPwxP lll ,...,2,111 21 =−>≥−>             (31) 
where 1x  is binomial with parameters n and rr Δ+  and 2x  is binomial with parameters n and 
r .  The result follows from the fact that the family of binomial distributions for fixed n is 
stochastically increasing in r (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994). 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Table 1. 
Case Value on the right-hand 
side of the inequality 
Worst case inequality 
for t tn r k< : 
Worst case inequality 
for ( )rink tt −≤  
( )
1) ,t
t
X n r
Y n i r
>
> −  
( )irYXcirc −−+ 54  
Worst case: 
iYX =−  
( ) ( )
7 5
3 2 5 4
c c
c c r c c r
− ≥
− − − ( ) ( )
7 5
1 3 5 4
c c
c c r c c r
− ≥
+ − −  
( )
2) ,t
t
X n r
Y n i r
>
≤ −  
( ) YcXcccrnt 4554 −+−  
Worst case: 
iirnrX
irnrY
+−=
−= ,
 
because 45 cc ≥  
( ) ( )
7 5
3 2 5 4
c c
c c r c c r
− ≥
− − −  
 
( ) ( )
7 5
1 3 5 4
c c
c c r c c r
− ≥
+ − −  
( )
3) ,t
t
X n r
Y n i r
≤
≤ −  
( )YXc −4  
Worst case: 
iYX =−  
( )rcccc 2347 −≥−  
 
( )rcccc 3147 +≥−  
( )
4) ,t
t
X n r
Y n i r
≤
> −  
( )
( )545
445
ccirYc
Xcccrnt
−+
−+−
 
Worst case: 
( )
rnX
rinY
t
t
=
−= ,
 
( )rccrcc 2347 −≥−  ( )rccrcc 3147 +≥−  
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Table 2. 
 0.2r =   0.3r =   0.4r =   0.5r =  
t  tk  lw
(1) 
1tq +   tk  lw  1tq +   tk  lw  1tq +   tk  lw  1tq +  
1 0 ∞  0  0 ∞  0  0 ∞  0  0 0 1 
2 0.4 ∞  0  0.6 ∞  0  0.8 ∞  0  1.0 0 1 
3 1.0 ∞  0  1.5 ∞  0  2.0 5 0.012  2.5 1 0.922 
3 0.8 ∞  0  1.2 ∞  0  1.6 ∞  0  2.0 3 0.524 
3 0.6 ∞  0  0.9 ∞  0  1.2 ∞  0  1.5 3 0.784 
4 1.6 ∞  0  2.4 8 0.001  3.2 6 0.049  4.0 4 0.405 
4 1.4 ∞  0  2.1 ∞  0  2.8 7 0.188  3.5 4 0.580 
4 1.2 ∞  0  1.8 ∞  0  2.4 7 0.040  3.0 5 0.455 
4 1.0 ∞  0  1.5 ∞  0  2.0 8 0.010  2.5 5 0.663 
4 0.8 ∞  0  1.2 ∞  0  1.6 8 0.025  2.0 6 0.524 
4 0.6 ∞  0  0.9 ∞  0  1.2 8 0.064  1.5 7 0.352 
(1) lw  = Threshold above which outsourcing is optimal (“∞ ”means there is no threshold; 
i.e., a=0 is optimal for all states in that group). =tq Probability that the threshold is 
crossed. 
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Captions for Figures and Tables: 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between RL chain and costs considered in the MDM. 
Figure 2. Illustration of the strict partial state ordering. 
 
Table 1. Worst case analysis for Condition 3  
Table 2. Value of the threshold and the probability of crossing it for { }0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5r =   
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